“Government of the people, by the people, for the people”: Epilogue (Gary Krenz)

This is the concluding post in a series concerning Lincoln’s formula for democracy in the Gettysburg Address: “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Previous posts can be found here, here, here, here, and here.

On November 3, we the people at last stood up and, in overwhelming fashion, reasserted our commitment to government of the people, by the people, for the people. Polls indicated that corruption and affordability were at the forefront of voters’ minds, cited as critical issues by 90% and 89%, respectively, of those polled. It is reasonable to read this as a ringing endorsement of the idea that government must be of the people, not of the self-serving few, and that it must be forthe people, not the would-be king and his cronies.  We have taken an important first step toward recovering the culture of democracy that we need to survive.

In these meditations on Lincoln’s formula, we have parsed it as follows:

  • Government of the people, in three senses:
    • Government over the people — i.e., the people as patients of the governance
    • Government belonging to the people — the people as proprietors of the government
    • Government drawn from the people — the people as constituents of the government
  • Government by the people: the people as agents of governance
  • Government for the people: the people as beneficiaries of governance

Legitimate democratic government requires all of these elements. For instance, government of the people in the sense of belonging to the people is hollow if the people have no real authority over their belongings — i.e., lack the authorial power of government by the people. Such a situation would be what Kant called tutelage, by other means — much as, to draw an example from monarchy, the four-year-old Louis XIV of France was proprietarily king while all real authority rested with his mother, Regent Anne of Austria.

Similarly, government by the people is subject to demagoguery, as we know all too well. Majorities and super-empowered minorities, as the case may be, can be inegalitarian, oppressive and unjust. Government by the people that is not directed with moral purpose — i.e., is not government for the people, for all the people — is not full democracy.

Government for the people would be a benevolent dictatorship if not accompanied by government by and of the people. (Such a dictatorship appears to be Elon Musk’s ideal, provided he gets to decide who the people are.) Such government would lack the key democratic virtues of participation and all that goes with it. And we know that a benevolent dictatorship is effectively an oxymoron, a cover for self-serving exploitation.

I will not continue to elaborate permutations but would certainly welcome comments.

All of this points us to the question: who are we the people?

We can ask this question in a couple of ways. One way concerns the scope covered by we the people; another sense concerns the constitution of we the people. In philosophical terminology, we can think of the first as addressing the extension of we the people and the second as addressing the intension of we the people.

The scope of we the people means who is included, and for what purposes, as citizens on the one hand and, more broadly, as those who are subject to the nation’s laws and protected by its laws. In both ways, the scope of we the people has expanded over the course of our history, as we have discussed previously. This expansion has not, of course, been a clean, linear growth but more like a jagged curve generally trending upward toward greater inclusion. There have been plenty of setbacks, and in the last few years we have seen a sharp downturn toward exclusion.

The intensional sense of we the people asks what is it that constitutes us as this one people that, in July of 1776, assumed “among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station “to which we were entitled? Of course, the Declaration itself, its issuance, was a moment of constitution, albeit a tenuous one that would take the seven years of Revolutionary War to resolve (and keep in mind that fully a third of the inhabitants of the Colonies were Loyalists during that war).

More ontologically, though, what is it that undergirds this constitution, this determination of us as a people? In the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln says it is our “dedication to a proposition.” That proposition — that self-evident proposition — is that “all men are created equal, and they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” [note: the list is not meant to be all-inclusive; there might be other self-evident rights not enumerated].  The successive clauses in the Declaration lay out, first, the socio-political requirements for a people to pursue the fulfillment of that proposition and, second, the complaints against the King for his violation of that proposition with respect to the colonies.

To be a people dedicated to a proposition is a remarkable thing. It means, among other things, that we are communally dedicated, associated, not by the past but toward the future, toward the realization of the proposition in the years ahead.

I recently came across this excellent brief account by Phillip Pinell of the political philosophy of the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. It is relevant here. I read and resonated with Ortega long ago but have not thought about him much in recent years. The point of Pinell’s piece is this: in the early 20th century, Ortega was reflecting on the demise of the Spanish empire (Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-American War being the nail in the coffin). Ortega’s issue was, how does a nation that had thought of itself as an empire — indeed, an empire of 300 years’ duration — come to terms with its identity when it was no longer an empire? His answer came in terms of a theory of nationhood that is well worth considering. A nation, Ortega thought, was not constituted by its inheritance but by its commitment to the future. As Pinell explains:

. . . a nation is something people do, and the past matters only insofar as it supplies the raw material — the circumstances — for a future project. . . . A community that understands itself as the custodian of a shared past will defend that past. A community that understands itself as engaged in a shared future-directed project has something more urgent to protect: not what already exists, but what its members are still trying to build. As Ortega put it, in defending the nation “we defend our tomorrows, not our yesterdays.”

A nation “dedicated to a proposition” is a nation directed to the future, to the ongoing effort to realize that proposition. Ortega did not have a particular proposition in mind when he was writing about Spain. But the United States, in Lincoln’s view, literally set forth a proposition as its constituting principle. It would be naive to think that generations of immigrants came to America because they expressly wanted to support that proposition. Still, to the extent that that proposition has held sway, America has been a place to which immigrants would want to come.

To be sure, working together toward the future realization of the proposition we have dedicated ourselves to also requires that we understand those “raw materials” of our past to which Pinell refers. The potter who does not understand the clay will not succeed in casting the pot. We must have the courage to acknowledge all of those impurities and irregularities, all of the poor conditioning and inconsistencies in our national “clay.”

A particular problem that potters refer to is clay that is “short” — i.e., clay that lacks plasticity and that tends to crack or break rather than bend or stretch. Lincoln knew very well how short the American clay was; it had occupied him his entire adult life. In the opening sentence of the Address, he quotes only one term from the Declaration’s proposition: equality. The dedication of we the people to realizing the proposition was basically thwarted by our defects with respect to this characteristic:

Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation,

conceived in liberty [conceived as a child in the womb and as an idea in the mind; we the people are a brainchild]

and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Slavery is not mentioned a single time in the Address, but it is the unsaid defect, the unspoken sin of we the people, that lies behind all that is said. Lincoln had determined that the Civil War, with all of its horrors for Americans North and South, would be, if we the people survived it, a reconditioning of the American clay. Only through this horror achieving a new equality could a “new birth of freedom” — which we might read as a rededication to the original proposition — come to be.

In his Second Inaugural Address, Lincoln put it this way:

If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.”

Note, again, that God’s judgment rests on all of us. We the people, not only the people of the South, were guilty of this massive failure to live up to the proposition that birthed us — a proposition originally written by a Virginia slaveholder. We all adopted the proposition as our covenant; our mutual sharing in sin and in righteousness relative to this proposition was what made preservation of the union a necessity.

The historian G.S. Borritt says that Lincoln “believed that if history would remember him, it would be for his Emancipation Proclamation.” Borritt writes of the Gettysburg Address:

Like Everett [the day’s main speaker], Lincoln believed that the Civil War would save or destroy America, and with it constitutional democracy. But what Lincoln meant now by “democracy” went far. He certainly meant to include immigrants or children of immigrants, who made up perhaps a quarter of the Union army. Lincoln hoped that the promise of the Declaration would embrace them, make them feel part of the American birthright. “They have a right to claim it as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration,” he had said at the start of his debates with Douglas in 1858, “and so they are.” But quoting the Declaration of Independence in November 1863 cut much deeper: it defended the Emancipation Proclamation that had drastically changed the character of the war.1

We the people are, I hope, beginning to come out of another “short” period in our history — our national crack-up corresponding to Trump’s presence in our national politics, driven, sadly, by the same deep fault. Our fight for the next two years must be a re-conditioning so that we can finally move forward in our nation-forming project to realize the proposition that all are equal.


1 Borritt, G. S. The Gettysburg Gospel : The Lincoln Speech That Nobody Knows. Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 117.

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